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Abstract
Coordinated online behaviors are an important part of infor-
mation and influence operations, as they allow a more effec-
tive disinformation’s spread. Most studies on coordinated be-
haviors involved manual investigations and the few existing
computational approaches make bold assumptions or over-
simplify the problem to make it tractable.
Here, we propose a new network-based framework for un-
covering and studying coordinated behaviors on social media.
Our proposal extends existing systems and goes beyond lim-
iting binary classifications of coordinated and uncoordinated
behaviors. It allows to uncover different patterns of coordina-
tion and to estimate the degree of coordination that charac-
terizes different communities. We apply our framework to a
dataset collected during the 2019 UK General Election, de-
tecting and characterizing coordinated communities that par-
ticipated in the electoral debate. Our work conveys both theo-
retical and practical implications, and provides more nuanced
and fine-grained results for studying online manipulation.
Introduction
In recent years, information or influence operations (IOs)
have been frequently carried out on social media with the
aim to mislead and to manipulate. IOs can take different
shapes, target different individuals, online crowds or com-
munities, and have diverse goals (Starbird, Arif, and Wil-
son 2019). Among the strategic tools used by perpetrators
are fake news, propaganda, hateful speech, astroturfing, col-
luding users (e.g., paid trolls), and automation (e.g., social
bots). Since the Donald Trump election and the Brexit ref-
erendum in 2016, each of these tools became the focus of
extensive scientific attention. The ongoing endeavors have
already led to a huge body of work on these issues and to a
plethora of different solutions for solving them. Despite the
efforts, the efficacy of the proposed solutions is debated, and
IOs still appear to pose a serious threat to our democracies
and societies (Barrett 2019).
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Meanwhile, groundbreaking advances in specific areas of
computing are causing profound changes to the online infor-
mation landscape. Advances in artificial intelligence brought
to the rise of deepfakes – synthetic media where the origi-
nal source has been modified via deep learning techniques.
Deepfakes allow crafting arbitrary texts that resemble the
writing style of a target person, as well as to produce audio
and video samples where a target person’s face and voice
are used to make it look like the person said something that
he or she actually never said. Unsurprisingly, these pow-
erful techniques have already been used for creating fake
news (Zellers et al. 2019), fake profile pictures for deceit-
ful accounts1, and to impersonate famous characters and
politicians on video. With deepfakes, detecting disinforma-
tion based on an article’s content, or detecting fake personas
by analyzing their posts and pictures might not be feasible
anymore (Boneh et al. 2019).
However, each IO must spread to and “infect” a large
number of users for it to be successful, independently on
its aims and the tools used to deceive. This often mandates
large and coordinated social media efforts in order for the
campaign to obtain a significant outreach, to exert influ-
ence, and thus to have an impact. In light of this considera-
tion, since 2018 all major platforms showed great interest in
studying coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB)2. Despite
often appearing together, coordination and inauthenticity are
two distinct concepts. For example, activists and other grass-
roots initiatives typically feature coordinated but authentic
behaviors. Conversely, one might maneuver a single fake ac-
count with the intent to mislead, thus exhibiting inauthentic
but uncoordinated behavior. The majority of existing efforts
for studying CIB involved a great deal of manual investi-
gations and computational approaches are still few and far
between. Among the challenges are the ambiguity and fuzi-
ness of CIB itself: What exactly is a coordinated behavior?
What is an inauthentic behavior? How many organized ac-
counts are needed for a (meaningful) coordinated behavior
to surface? Unfortunately, there are no agreed-upon answers
1https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-removes-accounts-ai-
generated-photos/
2https://about.fb.com/news/2018/12/inside-feed-coordinated-
inauthentic-behavior/
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to these questions and, thus, operationalizing these concepts
and developing computational methods for their analysis,
represent open challenges. In particular, no successful at-
tempt has been reported so far for automatically distinguish-
ing between authentic and inauthentic coordination (Vargas,
Emami, and Traynor 2020). Instead, a few interesting works
have been recently proposed for the simpler task of detecting
and studying coordinated behaviors, disregarding intent and
authenticity. In the present work, we also focus on this task.
To this end, the few existing techniques make bold assump-
tions or oversimplifications, such as using fixed thresholds
to obtain a binary distinction between coordinated and un-
coordinated behaviors (Pacheco et al. 2020). Coordination
however is a complex, non-binary concept, similarly to au-
tomation (Cresci 2020) and inauthenticity (Starbird 2019).
Here, we go beyond existing approaches for studying
coordinated behaviors by proposing a new network-based
framework that relaxes previous assumptions, and that ex-
tends and generalizes existing works. Within our framework,
coordination is defined as an unexpected, suspicious or ex-
ceptional similarity between any number of users. We do
not provide a binary classification of coordinated vs unco-
ordinated users, but instead we estimate the extent of coor-
dination. In practice, our framework builds a user-similarity
network. Then, we obtain the multi-scale backbone of the
network by retaining only statistically-relevant links and
nodes. Next, we iteratively perform community detection
on subsets of increasingly coordinated users. Our approach
does not require fixed thresholds for defining coordination.
Rather, it allows to study the whole extent of coordina-
tion found in the data, from weakly-coordinated users to
strongly-coordinated ones. Finally, we experiment with a set
of network measures for studying and characterizing coordi-
nated communities. We test our framework on Twitter in the
context of the 2019 UK General Election (GE), showing the
usefulness of our approach.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We move beyond existing approaches for detecting co-
ordination by proposing a more nuanced, non-binary,
network-based framework.
• We uncover coordinated communities that operated dur-
ing the 2019 UK GE, and we discuss them in light of their
role in electoral debate.
• We find and discuss different patterns of coordination, that
emerge from the behavior of different communities. This
is made possible by our non-binary approach to coordina-
tion, and it demonstrates the power of our framework.
• We empirically demonstrate that coordination and au-
tomation are orthogonal concepts. Thus, our framework
can complement long-studied techniques for detecting au-
tomation, manipulation and inauthenticity.
• We create and publicly share a large dataset for the 2019
UK GE, comprising 11M tweets shared by 1,2M users.
Related Work
Due to the many existing challenges, to date only few works
have attempted to develop computational means to de-
tect and characterize coordinated online behaviors. Among
them, the most similar approach to our present work was
proposed in (Pacheco et al. 2020; Pacheco, Flammini, and
Menczer 2020), which we extend and generalize. Pacheco
et al. propose to extract behavioral traces of online activ-
ity and use them to build a bipartite network. Then, they
project this network onto the accounts, obtaining a user-
similarity network. Next, they filter low-weight edges by
applying a restrictive, arbitrary similarity threshold. The re-
maining connected nodes are so similar to be deemed co-
ordinated. Finally, they compute and analyze the connected
components of the filtered network, and each component
is considered as a distinct group of coordinated users. We
have several differences with respect to (Pacheco et al. 2020;
Pacheco, Flammini, and Menczer 2020), the most impact-
ful one being that we do not apply a similarity-based fil-
ter. Their choice results in a sharp definition of coordinated
users, which are subsequently investigated, while uncoordi-
nated ones are ignored. However, this sharp distinction is
an artifact introduced to simplify the analysis. In our frame-
work we do not apply a similarity-based filter, but we iter-
atively perform community detection at different levels of
coordination. In this way, we are able to study the whole
extent of coordination among the accounts, uncovering dif-
ferent patterns and dynamics of coordination that would not
be visible with a simpler approach.
The work discussed in (Giglietto et al. 2020b; 2020a) fo-
cuses on a specific instance of CIB. Authors propose a 2-step
process for the detection of coordinated link sharing behav-
ior, and they test it on a Facebook dataset. In the first step,
they detect groups of entities that all shared a given link, al-
most at the same time. In the second step, the coordinated
networks are identified by connecting only those entities
that repeatedly shared the same links. Inauthenticity is then
manually assessed by analyzing shared domains and stories.
The proposed algorithm requires two parameters: one for
defining near-simultaneous link sharing, and the other for
defining repetitive link sharing. Similarly to (Pacheco et al.
2020), these parameters represent fixed similarity thresholds
used for filtering. Also Assenmacher et al. propose a 2-step
framework for detecting IOs (Assenmacher et al. 2020b;
2020a). Initially, they apply unsupervised stream clustering
and trend detection techniques to social media streams of
text, identifying groups of similar users. Then, they propose
to apply standard offline analyses, including manual inspec-
tion via visualizations and dashboards, for assessing inau-
thenticity. Another study leverages a ground-truth of coor-
dinated accounts involved in a disinformation campaign to
identify network measures for detecting IOs (Keller et al.
2020). Authors conclude that the traces left by coordina-
tion among astroturfing agents are more informative than
the typical individual account characteristics used for other
related tasks (e.g., social bot detection). In addition, they
also develop an astroturfing detection methodology based on
the previously identified coordination patterns. In (Fazil and
Abulaish 2020) is proposed a multi-attributed graph-based
approach for detecting CIB in Twitter. Authors model each
user with a 6-dimensional feature vector, compute pairwise
similarities obtaining a user-similarity graph and finally ap-
ply Markov clustering, labeling the resulting clusters as in-
authentic coordinated groups. In (Fazil and Abulaish 2020),
high coordination automatically implies inauthenticity.
Instead of proposing a new technique, the study in (Var-
gas, Emami, and Traynor 2020) focuses on determining the
usefulness and reliability of previously-proposed network-
based metrics of coordination. Several authors, including
some of those previously mentioned, report positive re-
sults for the detection of inauthentic behavior via the anal-
ysis of suspicious coordination (Ratkiewicz et al. 2011;
Keller et al. 2020; Fazil and Abulaish 2020). However, the
results of (Vargas, Emami, and Traynor 2020) show that,
when evaluated in non-trivial real-world scenarios, such pre-
viously proposed approaches are unable to distinguish be-
tween authentic (e.g., activists, fandoms) and inauthentic co-
ordination. These results confirm that coordination and inau-
thenticity are different concepts, and that high coordination
does not necessarily imply inauthenticity.
Dataset
By leveraging Twitter Streaming APIs, we collected a large
dataset of tweets related to the 2019 UK GE. Our data col-
lection covered one month prior to election day, from 12 Nov
to 12 Dec 2019, included. During that period, we collected
each tweet that contained at least one hashtag from a list we
created. Our list contains the most popular hashtags, both
those used by the two main parties, as well the neutral ones.
Table 1 lists all hashtags used at this step, the corresponding
political leaning (N: neutral, L: labour, C: conservative), as
well the data we collected. The tweets column only counts
quoted retweets if the quote text contains one of the hashtags
in table. The remaining quoted retweets are still included in
our dataset, but they are not counted in Table 1. In addition to
the aforementioned hashtags-based collection, we also col-
lected all tweets published by the official accounts of the 2
parties and their leaders, together with all the interactions
(i.e., retweets and replies) they received. Table 2 shows the
accounts and the collected data. Our final dataset for this
study is the combination of data shown in Tables 1, 2 and
quoted retweets, and includes 11,264,820 tweets published
by 1,179,659 distinct users. The dataset is publicly available
for research purposes3.
Method overview
In this section, we describe our network-based framework
for detecting coordinated behaviors. Our detailed methodol-
ogy is composed of the following 6 main steps, summarized
in Figure 1:
1. Select starting set of users. The first step concerns the se-
lection of those users to investigate. For instance, given a
large dataset, one might want to investigate most-active
users, such as superproducers or superspreaders, or all
users that tweeted with a particular hashtag, or even all
followers of a given prominent user. Whatever the selec-
tion criterion, this step returns a list of users to analyze.
3Anonymized link to be revealed upon paper acceptance.
hashtag leaning users tweets
#GE2019 N 436,356 2,640,966
#GeneralElection19 N 104,616 274,095
#GeneralElection2019 N 240,712 783,805
#VoteLabour L 201,774 917,936
#VoteLabour2019 L 55,703 265,899
#ForTheMany L 17,859 35,621
#ForTheManyNotTheFew L 22,966 40,116
#ChangeIsComing L 8,170 13,381
#RealChange L 78,285 274254
#VoteConservative C 52,642 238,647
#VoteConservative2019 C 13,513 34,195
#BackBoris C 36,725 157,434
#GetBrexitDone C 46,429 168,911
total – 668,312 4,983,499
Table 1: Statistics about data collected via hashtags.
production interactions
account leaning tweets retweets replies
@jeremycorbyn L 788 1,759,823 414,158
@UKLabour L 1,002 325,219 79,932
@BorisJohnson C 454 284,544 382,237
@Conservatives C 1,398 151,913 169,736
total – 3,642 2,521,499 1,046,063
Table 2: Statistics about data collected from accounts.
2. Select similarity measure. Both in our framework and in
previous work (Pacheco et al. 2020), unexpected similar-
ity between users is used as a proxy for coordination. Sim-
ilarity can be computed in many different ways. Hence,
this step deals with the selection of a similarity measure.
Examples of valid options are the cosine similarity be-
tween user feature vectors encoding account profile char-
acteristics, as done in (Fazil and Abulaish 2020), or the
Jaccard similarity between the sets of hashtags used by
each user, or between the sets of followings or retweeted
accounts.
3. Build user similarity network. In this step we compute
pairwise user similarities between all users identified at
step 1, by means of the metric selected at step 2. We lever-
age user similarities to build a weighted undirected user
similarity network G(E, V,W ), that encodes behavioral
and interaction patterns between users.
4. Filter user similarity network. When studying real-
world datasets of large IOs, the network resulting from
step 3 can be simply too big to analyze and even to visu-
alize. Hence, a filtering step is needed. Contrarily to pre-
vious work, we avoid simple filtering strategies based on
fixed edge weight thresholds. We recall that edge weights
encode similarity, and to a certain extent coordination, be-
tween users. As such, applying a weight threshold t and
discarding all edges e ∈ E whose weight w(e) < t would
mean to arbitrarily perform a binary distinction between
coordinated behaviors (w(e) ≥ t) and uncoordinated
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed framework for studying coordinated behavior.
ones (w(e) < t), which is a limiting and theoretically-
unmotivated choice. Instead, we propose to use complex
networks-based multiscale filtering methods, such as any
of those discussed in (Garlaschelli and Loffredo 2008;
Serrano, Boguna´, and Vespignani 2009; Tumminello et
al. 2011). These techniques retain statistically-meaningful
network structures, independently on their scale (i.e., edge
weight). As such, the network filtering step is not biased
towards certain levels of similarity and coordination, but
instead it erases network structures that convey limited in-
formation, allowing to focus on meaningful similarities.
5. Perform coordination-aware community detection.
The detection of coordinated groups of users is often
achieved via clustering and community detection. Given
the crude approach to filtering adopted in previous work,
the filtered user similarity network was considered to
only contain highly-coordinated users. A single run of a
community detection algorithm was thus enough to high-
light coordinated networks. In our case, however, the fil-
tered user similarity network still features diverse lev-
els of coordination. As such, we need a more nuanced
approach for surfacing coordinated behaviors. Our ap-
proach is based on an iterative process that takes into ac-
count increasing levels of coordination, as shown in Al-
gorithm 1. We begin by performing community detection
on the filtered network resulting from step 4, identifying
the set C0 of communities. Then, at each iteration we ap-
ply an increasingly restrictive similarity threshold ti to
edge weights, thus removing certain edges and discon-
nected nodes, and we repeat community detection on this
subnetwork Ge,vi . At each iteration, the community de-
tection algorithm is initialized with the set of communi-
ties Ci−1 found at the previous iteration. This guarantees
that the starting communities are kept, to a certain extent4,
throughout all the process. As a result of the “moving”
threshold, we are able to study how the structure and the
properties of coordinated communities change across the
whole spectrum of coordination.
6. Study coordinated communities. To study the structure
of coordinated communities and their patterns of coor-
dination, we employ several network measures. In addi-
4Communities may still break or merge together, which we ac-
count for in our process.
tion, we put communities into context, and we character-
ize their content production by applying natural language
processing techniques. By leveraging our novel approach
to the detection of coordinated communities described at
step 5, we are able to obtain results of these analyses as a
function of the extent of coordination between users.
Data: G(E, V,W ) // filtered user similarity network
Result: C
/* initialization */
1 C0 = perform community detection on G
2 C = 〈C0〉
3 t0 = min(w ∈W )
/* detect communities as a function of coordination */
4 i = 1
5 while ti−1 + δw ≤ max(w ∈W ) do
6 ti = ti−1 + δw // increment threshold by step δw
7 E− = {e ∈ E | w(e) < ti} // filter out edges
8 Gei = G− E−
9 V − = {v ∈ V ei | d(v) = 0} // filter out nodes
10 Ge,vi = G
e
i − V − // obtain subnetwork Ge,vi
11 initialize community detection with Ci−1
12 Ci = perform community detection on Ge,vi
13 append Ci to C // trace evolving communities
14 i = i+ 1
15 end
16 return C
Algorithm 1: Coordination-aware community de-
tection.
The main novelties of our approach with respect to pre-
vious work, and particularly to (Pacheco et al. 2020), are
steps 4 and 5. In turn, our nuanced coordination detection
approach also enables more in-depth analyses at step 6.
Surfacing coordination in 2019 UK GE
In the following, we describe how we implemented and ap-
plied the aforementioned framework to uncover coordinated
behaviors on Twitter related to the 2019 UK GE. The con-
tent of this section roughly corresponds to steps 1 to 5 of
our methodology, while step 6 (i.e., analysis of coordinated
communities) is described in the next section.
User similarity network. For our analysis, we posed our
attention on the activity of superspreaders – coarsely de-
labour conservative
Figure 2: Filtered user similarity network of the 2019 UK
GE. Colors encode user political leaning.
fined as the most influential spreaders of information, in-
cluding mis- and disinformation, in online social media (Pei
et al. 2014). Here, we defined superspreaders as the top 1%
of users that shared more retweets. This resulted in select-
ing for our analysis 10,782 users. Despite representing only
the 1% of all users in the online electoral debate, super-
spreaders shared the 39% of all tweets and the 44.2% of
retweets. Thus, by focusing on them, we investigated the
most prolific users and a considerable share of all mes-
sages. Next, we characterized each superspreader with a TF-
IDF weighted vector of its retweeted tweet IDs. In other
words, each user is modeled according to the tweets she
retweeted. The TF-IDF weight allows to reduce the rele-
vance of highly popular tweets in our dataset, and to empha-
size similarities that are due to retweets of unpopular tweets
– a much more suspicious behavior (Mazza et al. 2019;
Pacheco et al. 2020). Then, we computed user similarities
as the cosine similarity of user vectors. Before studying the
network, we applied the technique proposed in (Serrano,
Boguna´, and Vespignani 2009) to retain only statistically-
relevant edges, thus obtaining the multiscale backbone of
our network, which we exploited for the remaining analy-
ses. The resulting filtered user similarity network contains
276,775 edges and is shown in Figure 2. In addition, Fig-
ure 3 shows the distribution of edge weights in the filtered
network. The filtering step preserved the rich, multiscale na-
ture of the network.
Political leaning. In Figure 2, nodes are colored based
on their political leaning, as inferred from the hashtags that
they used. In particular, we employed a label propagation
algorithm for assigning a polarity score to each hashtag in
our dataset. The score for a given hashtag is inferred from
its co-occurrences with seeds of known polarity. We used the
13 hashtags in Table 1 as the seeds for the label propagation.
Figure 3: Edge weight distribution of the unfiltered and fil-
tered user similarity networks.
Finally, a user’s polarity is computed as the term-frequency
weighted average of the polarities of the hashtags used by
that user.
Network interpretation. As shown in Figure 2, the user
similarity network presents a visible structure characterized
by several large communities and a few smaller ones. With
respect to political polarization, all users can be grouped into
3 main classes: labourists (red-colored), conservatives (blue-
colored), and neutral users (yellow-colored). We performed
a first sanity check by comparing structural properties of the
network with political ones. In particular, colors in the net-
work appear to be clearly separated. In other words, commu-
nities derived from network structure appear to be extremely
politically homogeneous, and we do not have any cluster that
contains users with markedly different colors. Moving for-
ward, the conservative cluster appears to be sharply sepa-
rated from the rest of the network, while the labourist and
neutral clusters are more intertwined with one another. This
interesting property of our network closely resembles the
political landscape in the UK ahead of the 2019 GE. In-
deed, one of the main topics of the debate was Brexit, which
lead to a strong polarization between conservatives and all
other parties (Schumacher 2019). In addition, the first-past-
the-post UK voting system also motivated anti-Tory electors
to converge on the candidate of the party having the highest
chances to defeat the conservative’s one in each constituency
– a strategy dubbed tactical voting5. Our rich and informa-
tive network clearly embeds and conveys these nuances.
Coordinated communities. Building on these promising
preliminary results, we are now interested in a fine-grained
analysis of the communities found in the user similarity net-
work. In (Pacheco et al. 2020), this step was carried out by
analyzing the connected components of their similarity net-
works. As anticipated, in order to be reasonably sure about
coordination, Pacheco et al. enforced very restrictive edge
weight filters, so as to only retain edges with very large
weights (e.g., users whose cosine similarity ≥ 0.9, on a 0
to 1 scale). As a consequence of this aggressive filtering,
the networks were broken down into several disconnected
5https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/08/tactical-
voting-guide-2019-keep-tories-out-remain-voter-general-election
more
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Figure 4: Coordinated communities found within the filtered user similarity network. Communities are color-coded. For each
color, intensity encodes the extent of coordination.
(a) CON. (b) LAB. (c) TVT. (d) SNP. (e) B60. (f) ASE. (g) LCH.
Figure 5: TF-IDF weighted hashtag clouds for the different coordinated communities. Hashtag polarity is color-coded.
components, hence the analysis of connected components.
Instead, in our study the user similarity network features di-
verse degrees of similarity and coordination, as testified by
the distribution of edge weights in Figure 3. Therefore, we
carried out this analysis by applying community detection,
and in particular the well-known Louvain algorithm (Blon-
del et al. 2008). This step in our analysis corresponds to line
1 of Algorithm 1. Detected communities (resolution = 1.5,
minimum size at t0 = 20) are outlined in Figure 4 and are
briefly described in the following. Users exhibiting higher
coordination with other users are assigned darker shades of
color. For each community we also computed its TF-IDF
weighted hashtag cloud, as shown in Figure 5, so as to high-
light the debated topics.
1. CON: The community of conservative users that was
clearly visible in Figure 2 was also detected by our com-
munity detection algorithm. It includes all major conser-
vative users (e.g., @BorisJohnson and @Conservatives), and it
is characterized by a majority of hashtags supporting the
conservative party (voteconservative), its leader (backboris) and
Brexit (getbrexitdone).
2. LAB: Similarly, also the dense group of labour users
that we highlighted in Figure 2 has been identified as a
distinct community of labourists. These users are charac-
terized by hashtags supporting the party (votelabour), their
leader (jc4pm), and traditional labour flags like healthcare
(saveournhs) and climate change (climatedebate). Notably, the
absence of Brexit-related keywords seems to confirm the
alleged ambiguity of Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign on this
topic6.
3. TVT: The largest group of neutral users in Figure 2,
tightly related to LAB users, was assigned to this com-
munity. These users debated topics related to liberal
democrats (votelibdem), anti-Tory (liarjohnson), anti-Brexit
(stopbrexit) and to the campaigns promoting tactical voting
(votetactically, tacticalvote).
4. SNP: The remaining share of neutral users was assigned
to this community, related to the Scottish National Party
(SNP). The main hashtags used by members of this com-
6https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/09/03/labours-
policy-constructive-ambiguity-brexit-running-road/
munity support the party (votesnp) and ask for a new ref-
erendum for the independence from the UK (indyref2020).
The traditional hostility of SNP against Brexit and To-
ries (Jackson et al. 2019) also explains the proximity of
this cluster to the LAB and TVT ones.
5. B60: This small cluster identifies activists involved
in the so-called Backto60 initiative (backto60, 50swomen),
which represents 4 million women born in the 1950s that
are negatively affected by state pension age equalisation.
Their instances have been addressed in the Labour mani-
festo, while Conservatives denied their support to the ini-
tiative despite Boris Johnson’s promises7. The political
connections of Backto60 activists are well reflected in our
network, as represented by the B60 cluster being linked
to both the LAB and TVT clusters.
6. ASE: The tightly connected users in this cluster are
all strongly leaning towards conservatives, as also clearly
visible by their connections. However, their activities are
mainly devoted towards attacking the Labour party and
its leader, rather than to support the Tories. As con-
firmed from Figure 5f, some of the most relevant hash-
tags of this cluster are against labours (labourlies, nevercorbyn)
and, in particular, are about the antisemitism allegations
(labourantisemitism, votelabourvoteracism) that held the stage dur-
ing the entire electoral campaign8.
7. LCH: Finally, the last cluster is again composed of ac-
tivists, similarly to the B60 cluster. This time activists
were protesting against “loan charge”, a tax charge in-
troduced to contrast a form of tax avoidance based on
disguised remunerations. Anti-loan charge campaigners
claim that it is a retrospective taxation that, due to the ab-
normally long period of application, caused involved peo-
ple to return unsustainable amounts, also inducing several
suicides9.
The analysis of the communities detected in our user simi-
larity network allowed to identify both large clusters, each
corresponding to one of the major political forces involved
in the election, as well as much smaller ones. The small clus-
ters are related to highly organized activists (B60, LCH) and
political campaigns (ASE). The previous analysis provided
some first results into the presence of coordinated behaviors
in the 2019 UK GE and, in particular, it allowed to uncover
groups that featured at least a small degree of coordination.
However, since our network embeds different degrees of co-
ordination among its users, it still does not provide results
towards the extent of such coordination and the patterns of
coordination that characterize such groups. These crucial
points are tackled in the next section.
7https://pensionsage.com/pa/Backto60-granted-leave-to-
appeal.php
8https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/revealed-the-depth-of-
labour-anti-semitism-bb57h9pdz
9https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/disguised-
remuneration-independent-loan-charge-review/guidance
Figure 6: Relationship between coordination and size of co-
ordinated communities.
Analysis of coordinated behaviors
In previous work, once detected, coordinated communi-
ties were visualized and manually inspected (Pacheco et al.
2020). In other words, existing pipelines for automatically
studying coordinated behaviors stop at the detection of co-
ordinated communities (step 5 in our framework), without
providing insights into the patterns of coordination, which
are left to human analysts. Contrarily, our multifaceted anal-
ysis allows our framework to produce results for estimating
the extent and for investigating the patterns of coordination.
Visual inspection. Regarding the extent of coordination,
a visual inspection of Figure 4 already reveals interesting
insights. For instance, large communities such as LAB and
CON are simultaneously characterized by a multitude of
weakly-coordinated users (light-colored) and by a smaller
core of strongly-coordinated ones (dark-colored). Instead,
other communities only feature either weakly- or strongly-
coordinated behaviors. For example, the SNP and TVT com-
munities appear to be characterized by mildly-coordinated
behaviors, with only a few strongly-coordinated users that
are spread out in the network and not clustered together.
On the opposite, the small communities of activists (B60,
LCH and ASE) appear to be almost completely characterized
by strongly-coordinated behaviors, as represented by small,
compact, and dark-colored clusters.
Network measures. In the following, we formalize these
intuitions, and we propose a set of network measures for
quantifying them. By applying steps 5 and 6 of our frame-
work, we are able to produce these results automatically for
each uncovered coordinated community. In particular, the
while-loop in Algorithm 1 repeatedly performs community
detection on subnetworks obtained by iteratively removing
edges (and the resulting disconnected nodes) based on their
weight. We begin by removing weak edges, and we pro-
ceed with stronger ones until we have removed all edges and
nodes in the network. Since edge weight is a proxy for coor-
dination, each subnetwork that we obtain with this process
features a different degree of coordination. By studying the
evolution of coordinated communities throughout this sim-
ulation, we are able to characterize their patterns of coordi-
nation. In the following, we present results for each coordi-
nated community in terms of standard network measures, as
a function of coordination. Our measure of coordination is
the percentile rank of edge weights in the filtered network –
(a) Density. (b) Clustering coefficient. (c) Assortativity.
Figure 7: Network measures computed for each coordinated community, as a function of the extent of coordination. By studying
the whole extent of coordination among users, we are able to highlight the radically different patterns of coordination that
characterize different communities, as highlighted by opposite trends in given network measures.
that is, the percentile rank of the distribution shown in Fig-
ure 3. Percentile rank is the proportion of values in a distri-
bution that a particular value is ≥ to. For example, a given
result measured for a degree of coordination = 0.9, means
that the result was obtained from a network that includes
only the top-10% of strongest edges.
The first aspect we consider is the size of coordinated
communities. Figure 6 shows how the number and the per-
centage of nodes in each coordinated community changes,
as a function of coordination. This analysis quantifies the
observations we previously derived by visual inspection.
It clearly shows that some communities are characterized
by stronger coordination than others. This is reflected by
the plateaux that strongly-coordinated communities, such as
LCH and ASE, exhibit until some large values of coordina-
tion. On the contrary, communities such as B60, LAB and
TVT exhibit a marked decreasing trend throughout all the
spectrum of coordination. This analysis is also useful to-
wards estimating a characteristic value of coordination for a
given community. For instance, by using the elbow method,
the LCH community could be described by a coordination
value ' 0.9, since the vast majority of its members fea-
ture a degree of coordination≥ than that. Similarly, the ASE
community could be characterized by a coordination value
' 0.55. These results also imply that, in general, each com-
munity has its own characteristic value of coordination, and
that methods that applying the same arbitrary fixed thresh-
old to all communities risk neglecting and erasing relevant
patterns.
Next, we evaluate structural properties of coordinated
communities. Density is a measure of the fraction of the ac-
tual connections between nodes in a network, with respect to
all possible connections. This aspect is helpful towards as-
sessing whether the most coordinated users are all linked to
one another, or whether they act in different regions of their
community. Results shown in Figure 7a highlight interest-
ing patterns. First of all, some communities are overall more
clustered than others, such as ASE and LCH. This is another
indicator of strongly-coordinated behaviors. Then, we have
rising and decreasing density trends. In detail, SNP exhibits
a negative correlation between density and coordination, im-
plying that the most coordinated users in that community
are likely not colluded nor organized between themselves.
On the contrary, the most coordinated members of B60 are
likely well-organized together, as shown by the density spike
observed when coordination ≥ 0.8. Clustering coefficient,
shown in Figure 7b, provides similar results with respect to
density. In fact, it shows decreasing trends for SNP, LCH
and TVT, as well as rising trends for CON and LAB and, to
a much greater extent, for B60. Trends in density and clus-
tering coefficient confirm that coordination' 0.9 appears to
be a representative value for LCH.
Finally, we evaluate the assortativity of coordinated net-
works. Here, assortativity measures the extent to which
nodes with high degree are connected to other nodes
with high degree, and vice versa. Again, different patterns
emerge. In particular, some coordinated communities (e.g.,
ASE and LAB) are moderately disassortative. This result rep-
resents a situation where a few nodes with high degree are
connected to many nodes with low degree, realizing a net-
work structure that is similar to a star. In turn, this high-
lights a pattern of coordination characterized by a few hubs
that are supported by many less important nodes – a pat-
tern that was already found to be informative when study-
ing online manipulations (Nizzoli et al. 2020). Conversely,
the B60 community appears to be strongly assortative, es-
pecially when considering coordination in the region of 0.8.
This finding represents a situation where many similar nodes
are connected to each other, reinforcing the idea of a clique
of coordinated peers. By combining all results shown in Fig-
ure 7, the B60 community appears to be well-described by
a coordination value ' 0.8.
Themes and narratives. Until now we have only lever-
aged network measures to characterize coordinated commu-
nities. However, their content production can also reveal in-
teresting insights into their preferred narratives. Here, we
propose and briefly experiment with a text-based analysis
that can be used to investigate the activity of coordinated
groups. In particular, we are interested in highlighting the
differences in the content produced by the coordinated users
in a community, with respect to all other – less coordi-
nated – users of that community. One way to reach our goal
(a) B60. (b) LCH.
Figure 8: Application of word shift graphs for highlighting
narratives that characterize coordinated communities.
is by exploiting word shift graphs (Gallagher et al. 2020),
which allow comparing two corpora by highlighting those
terms that mostly contribute to differentiate them. We ap-
ply word shift graphs in our context by selecting all tweets
shared by members of a community as the reference corpus,
and all tweets shared by strongly-coordinated users in that
community as the comparison corpus. Meaningful strongly-
coordinated users from a community can be picked by lever-
aging results of our previous network-based analyses. For
instance, the B60 community can be assigned a coordina-
tion value ' 0.8 while LCH can be characterized by co-
ordination ' 0.9. Thus, in Figure 8 we highlight content
production differences between all users in B60 and LCH,
with respect to the users in those communities whose co-
ordination ≥ 0.8 and 0.9, respectively. In figures, words
are ranked based on their contribution towards differentiat-
ing coordinated and non-coordinated users. Yellow-colored
words (right-hand side of each word shift graph) are in-
formative for coordinated users while blue-colored words
(left-hand side) are informative for non-coordinated users.
The informativeness of the different words towards char-
acterizing coordinated users (i.e., their shift) is computed
by means of Shannon entropy (Gallagher et al. 2020). As
shown, this analysis reveals that coordinated users embrace
much more specific narratives and themes with respect to
non-coordinated users. In fact, while both B60 and LCH
are characterized by generic labourist topics, coordinated
users in those communities fight for 50s women’s rights and
against the loan charge tax.
Use of automation. As a last experiment on coordi-
nated behavior, we are interested in evaluating the rela-
tionship between coordination and use of automation. De-
tection of automation (e.g., social bots) has been a matter
of study for years, and has been one of the most widely
used approaches for investigating online deception and ma-
nipulation (Cresci 2020). Many bot detection techniques
have been proposed (Chavoshi, Hamooni, and Mueen 2016;
Varol et al. 2017; Cresci et al. 2018; Mazza et al. 2019),
but their effectiveness towards tracking IOs and CIB is
(a) Mean Botometer scores. (b) Suspended accounts.
Figure 9: Relationship between coordination and use of au-
tomation. As shown, these appear to be two orthogonal and
largely uncorrelated concepts.
still debated10. For these reasons, we compared our assess-
ments on coordination with the automation score provided
by Botometer (Yang et al. 2019). We used the maximum of
Botometer’s English and universal scores, both provided in
the [0, 1] range, as our automation score. In addition, we also
considered Twitter suspensions as an indicator of possible
automation or inauthenticity. Then, similarly to our previ-
ous analyses, we reported the mean automation scores and
the percentage of suspended users for the different coordi-
nated communities, as a function of coordination. Figure 9
shows the results of this analysis. Automation appears to be
almost completely uncorrelated with coordination. Indepen-
dently of coordination, results do not show meaningful dif-
ferences between our communities, with the sole exception
of LCH for which we measured overall higher automation
scores. Other communities are more affected by Twitter sus-
pensions, such as both clusters of conservative users (CON
and ASE). Interestingly, we notice a marked downward trend
of suspensions for the B60 group, which might indicate an
authentic, strongly-coordinated grassroots initiative.
Overall, our results confirm that coordination and automa-
tion are two different and orthogonal concepts. On the one
hand, this suggests that using automation and bot detection
to study CIB might be ineffective and leading to inaccurate
results. On the other hand, it motivates to complement exist-
ing analyses on IOs with new results that are based on the
study of coordinated behaviors.
Conclusions
We addressed the problem of uncovering coordinated be-
haviors in social media. We proposed a new network-based
framework and we applied it for studying coordinated be-
haviors in the 2019 UK General Election (GE). Our work
has both theoretical and practical implications.
From the theoretical standpoint of fighting IOs and CIB,
our framework goes beyond a binary definition of coordi-
nated vs uncoordinated behaviors, and it allows to investi-
gate the whole spectrum of coordination. We reach this goal
via an improved network filtering and a coordination-aware
10https://blog.twitter.com/en us/topics/company/2020/bot-or-
not.html
community detection process. Our nuanced approach allows
to uncover different patterns of coordination. We demon-
strate that a certain extent of coordination is present in ev-
ery online community, but that not all coordinated groups
are equally interesting. Furthermore, while previous works
blindly applied fixed coordination thresholds to whole net-
works, our approach allows to estimate the degree of coordi-
nation that characterizes each different community, opening
up more accurate and fine-grained downstream analyses.
From the practical standpoint, we created and shared a
Twitter dataset for the 2019 UK GE. Despite smaller num-
bers, we found that conservatives were overall more coor-
dinated than labourists, and that they also featured a higher
degree of automation and Twitter suspensions. However, the
communities with the largest degree of coordination were
not supporters of the main parties, but rather small groups of
activists and political antagonists.
In summary, our work goes in the direction of embracing
the growing complexity of important phenomena such as on-
line deception and manipulation. Doing so would allow us
to come up with better models of our complex reality, which
would give us higher chances of providing accurate and reli-
able results. Despite still not being able to distinguish inau-
thentic coordinated behaviors from authentic ones, our work
makes a step forward in this direction by providing more
nuanced and more accurate results.
References
Assenmacher, D.; Adam, L.; Trautmann, H.; and Grimme, C.
2020a. Semi-automatic campaign detection by means of text
stream clustering. In AAAI FLAIRS’20.
Assenmacher, D.; Clever, L.; Pohl, J. S.; Trautmann, H.; and
Grimme, C. 2020b. A two-phase framework for detecting ma-
nipulation campaigns in social media. In SCSM’20.
Barrett, P. M. 2019. Disinformation and the 2020 Election: How
the social media industry should prepare. White paper. Center for
Business and Human Rights, New York University.
Blondel, V. D.; Guillaume, J.-L.; Lambiotte, R.; and Lefebvre, E.
2008. Fast unfolding of communities in large networks. Journal of
statistical mechanics: theory and experiment 2008(10):P10008.
Boneh, D.; Grotto, A. J.; McDaniel, P.; and Papernot, N. 2019.
How relevant is the Turing test in the age of sophisbots? IEEE
Security & Privacy 17(6):64–71.
Chavoshi, N.; Hamooni, H.; and Mueen, A. 2016. DeBot: Twitter
bot detection via warped correlation. In IEEE ICDM’16.
Cresci, S.; Di Pietro, R.; Petrocchi, M.; Spognardi, A.; and Tesconi,
M. 2018. Social Fingerprinting: Detection of Spambot Groups
Through DNA-Inspired Behavioral Modeling. IEEE TDSC 15(4).
Cresci, S. 2020. A decade of social bot detection. CACM 63(10).
Fazil, M., and Abulaish, M. 2020. A socialbots analysis-driven
graph-based approach for identifying coordinated campaigns in
Twitter. Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems 38:2961–2977.
Gallagher, R. J.; Frank, M. R.; Mitchell, L.; Schwartz, A. J.; Rea-
gan, A. J.; Danforth, C. M.; and Dodds, P. S. 2020. Generalized
word shift graphs: A method for visualizing and explaining pair-
wise comparisons between texts. arXiv preprint arXiv:2008.02250.
Garlaschelli, D., and Loffredo, M. I. 2008. Maximum likelihood:
Extracting unbiased information from complex networks. Physical
Review E 78(1):015101.
Giglietto, F.; Righetti, N.; Rossi, L.; and Marino, G. 2020a. Co-
ordinated link sharing behavior as a signal to surface sources of
problematic information on facebook. In SMSociety’20.
Giglietto, F.; Righetti, N.; Rossi, L.; and Marino, G. 2020b. It takes
a village to manipulate the media: coordinated link sharing behav-
ior during 2018 and 2019 italian elections. Information, Commu-
nication & Society 1–25.
Jackson, D.; Thorsen, E.; Lilleker, D.; and Weidhase, N. 2019. UK
Election Analysis 2019: Media, Voters and the Campaign. Techni-
cal report, Bournemouth University.
Keller, F. B.; Schoch, D.; Stier, S.; and Yang, J. 2020. Political
astroturfing on twitter: How to coordinate a disinformation cam-
paign. Political Communication 37(2):256–280.
Mazza, M.; Cresci, S.; Avvenuti, M.; Quattrociocchi, W.; and
Tesconi, M. 2019. RTbust: Exploiting temporal patterns for botnet
detection on Twitter. In ACM WebSci’19. ACM.
Nizzoli, L.; Tardelli, S.; Avvenuti, M.; Cresci, S.; Tesconi, M.; and
Ferrara, E. 2020. Charting the landscape of online cryptocurrency
manipulation. IEEE Access 8:113230–113245.
Pacheco, D.; Hui, P.-M.; Torres-Lugo, C.; Truong, B. T.; Flammini,
A.; and Menczer, F. 2020. Uncovering coordinated networks on
social media. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05658.
Pacheco, D.; Flammini, A.; and Menczer, F. 2020. Unveiling coor-
dinated groups behind white helmets disinformation. In WWW’20
Companion.
Pei, S.; Muchnik, L.; Andrade Jr, J. S.; Zheng, Z.; and Makse, H. A.
2014. Searching for superspreaders of information in real-world
social media. Scientific reports 4:5547.
Ratkiewicz, J.; Conover, M. D.; Meiss, M.; Gonc¸alves, B.; Flam-
mini, A.; and Menczer, F. M. 2011. Detecting and tracking political
abuse in social media. In AAAI ICWSM’11.
Schumacher, S. 2019. Brexit divides the UK, but partisanship
and ideology are still key factors. Technical report, Pew Research
Center.
Serrano, M. A´.; Boguna´, M.; and Vespignani, A. 2009. Extracting
the multiscale backbone of complex weighted networks. PNAS
106(16).
Starbird, K.; Arif, A.; and Wilson, T. 2019. Disinformation as
Collaborative Work: Surfacing the Participatory Nature of Strategic
Information Operations. In ACM CSCW’19.
Starbird, K. 2019. Disinformation’s spread: bots, trolls and all of
us. Nature 571:449–449.
Tumminello, M.; Micciche, S.; Lillo, F.; Piilo, J.; and Mantegna,
R. N. 2011. Statistically validated networks in bipartite complex
systems. PloS one 6(3):e17994.
Vargas, L.; Emami, P.; and Traynor, P. 2020. On the detection
of disinformation campaign activity with network analysis. arXiv
preprint arXiv:2005.13466.
Varol, O.; Ferrara, E.; Davis, C. A.; Menczer, F.; and Flammini, A.
2017. Online human-bot interactions: Detection, estimation, and
characterization. In AAAI ICWSM’17.
Yang, K.-C.; Varol, O.; Davis, C. A.; Ferrara, E.; Flammini, A.; and
Menczer, F. 2019. Arming the public with artificial intelligence to
counter social bots. Human Behavior and Emerging Technologies
1(1).
Zellers, R.; Holtzman, A.; Rashkin, H.; Bisk, Y.; Farhadi, A.; Roes-
ner, F.; and Choi, Y. 2019. Defending against neural fake news. In
NeurIPS’19.
